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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to develop concepts of project and contract organization to predict the
selection of contract type on infrastructure projects.  Conventional wisdom is that at low risk
fixed price contracts are best, moving to remeasurement and then cost plus as risk increases.
We started trying to predict this from a transaction cost perspective, and such an analysis
confirmed conventional wisdom.  However, it does not fit with current practice.  Further, the
differences in transaction costs are small compared to differences in contract out-turn cost
that occur under the different motivational effects of different contract types.  We therefore
take a different perspective.  We assume the purpose behind a project contract is to create a
cooperative project organization, in which all participants, clients and contractors, are
motivated to achieve common objectives, their goals are aligned.  This analysis confirms
modern practice, and shows selection of contract type is related to uncertainty in the project's
deliverables, and uncertainty in the process of their delivery.  Build only remeasurement
contracts are used where uncertainty of both product and process is low.  Design and build
fixed price contracts are used where uncertainty of the product is low, but the uncertainty in
the process of delivery is high.  Fixed price contracts should be used where both are high.
We extend the analysis to show when the client should be involved in the project organization
in an alliance contract, and when they should not, as in a traditional project contract.
3INTRODUCTION
During 2000, the authors ran a series of courses for the European Construction Institute,
including ones on Contracts & Procurement, and Partnering & Alliancing.  During these
courses we were asked when fixed price, remeasurement or cost plus contracts should be
used, and when alliancing contracts (which involve the owner in the project organization)
should be used rather than traditional approaches (which do not).  In response to the first
question, we were only able to give the usual, glib answer that fixed price should be used
when the risk is low, and cost plus when it is high.  However, we were not able to answer the
follow-up question of “Why?”  There is recent research which showa when alliancing
contracts should be used1.  Perceived wisdom is that as risk increases on a project, the
appropriate form of contract to govern the relationship between the client and contractor
changes from fixed price, to remeasurement and finally to cost plus.  But there is no real
theory of project or contract organization that says why this should be so.  Similarly there is
no theory of when to involve the client in the project team and when not.
The authors set out with the intention of taking a transaction cost perspective to show how
different contract types, as different governance structures, optimize governance costs
associated with the different contract types in different risk scenarios.  Turner and Keegan2
used a transaction cost perspective to analyze governance structures adopted by client and
contractor organizations to manage the contractual relationship on projects.  Williamson3 says
that choice of appropriate governance structures for a contractual relationship is by definition
a transaction cost issue.  Thus, we thought it might be possible to bring a transaction cost
perspective to bear on the selection of appropriate contracts types, and on whether to involve
the owner or not.  What this analysis suggested is transaction costs are not dependent on risk
per se, but uncertainty in the definition of the project’s product.  At low levels of uncertainty,
transactions costs associated with fixed price contracts are lowest, at intermediate levels those
associated with remeasurement ones are lowest, and at high levels of uncertainty those
associated with cost plus one are lowest, confirming perceived wisdom.
However, the role of transaction costs in determining project type is not supported by modern
practice, and there is a fundamental flaw in the argument.  The flaw is that if the project
pricing terms are to be determined by the transaction costs, then out-turn cost of the contract
works must be independent of the pricing structure.  But different pricing structures motivate
the contractor in different ways, so we expect out-turn costs to be different under different
pricing structures.  These differences are greater than the differences in transaction costs.
Thus, the selection of appropriate contract pricing terms is determined by goal alignment, that
is trying to get the contractor to share in the client’s success from the project.
We therefore adopt an alternative view that the purpose of project organization is to create a
cooperative system between client and contractors based on shared objectives.  We show the
selection of contract type is determined by uncertainty in the definition of the project’s
product and of the process to deliver it.  At low levels of uncertainty of both, remeasurement
contract’s are appropriate.  If the process is uncertain, but the product certain, fixed price
design and build contracts are preferred.  What the contractor has to deliver is clearly defined,
but they take responsibility for finding the best work method for delivering it, and make profit
from managing risk.  If both product and process are uncertain, cost plus contracts, based on
an alliance arrangement are preferred.  The client and contractor work together to achieve the
best outcome and share in any benefits that accrue.  It also just happens that in selecting the
appropriate contract to achieve goal alignment that transaction costs are minimized.
4In this paper we aim to contribute to a theory project organization and contract type selection,
which is in an embryonic stage.  We start by reviewing concepts selection of contract type in
developing a project organization, and then definitions of different contract types by payment
terms.  We show how a transaction cost analysis predicts the conventional view of when the
three types of contract should be used.  However, we go on to point out the weaknesses in this
analysis, and how its predictions do not conform to modern practice.  We show how a need to
obtain goal alignment and to avoid opportunistic behaviour lead to a better prediction of
contract type selection.  Finally we describe how alliance contracts are used to obtain goal
alignment, but review when they should be used and when they should not.
Our analysis in this paper is mainly theoretical.  However, to support our findings, we have
done some field-work.  We have interviewed people involved in major infrastructure projects,
(Table 1).  We have also drawn on research done by the Engineering Construction Institute1.
Given our sources, our results mainly apply to infrastructure, engineering construction and
heavy engineering, and not to information systems projects.
CONCEPTS
A contract is a way of creating a project organization.  Levitt and March4 say:
The problem of organizing [is] seen as one of transforming a conflict (political) system into a
cooperative (rational) one.  A conflict system is one in which individuals have objectives that
are not jointly consistent.  It organizes through exchanges and other interactions between
strategic actors.  A cooperative system is one in which individuals act rationally in the name
of a common objective.
Conflict systems can arise either through bounded rationality (the participants would like to
act rationally but through human frailty fail to) or opportunism (the participants try to
optimize their position at the expense of others).  In order to reduce the chance of both of
these happening, the client (who is ultimately responsible for creating the project organization
and has the most to gain from its being effective) needs to:
• increase communication flow on the project to ensure participants have sufficient
information to behave rationally, and to reduce the chance of the deceit on which
opportunism depends
• ensure the project participants are properly incentivized so that all the project participants
do indeed share a common objective
Appropriate governance structures (determined by the contractual relationships) need to be
put in place to achieve these ends.  Williamson3 says:
Transaction cost analysis [is] an examination of the comparative costs of planning, adapting,
and monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures ... [so as to] align
transactions (which differ in their attributes) with governance structures (which differ in their
costs and competencies) in a discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way.
In this paper we start by looking at the cost of planning, adapting and monitoring task
completion under different contract payment terms.  And then we look at how the different
contract types create cooperative arrangements through goal alignment.  But first we define
what we mean by the different contract types.
5DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this paper we assume there are five standard forms of project contract
payment terms.  Throughout the rest of the paper we talk about just three, fixed price,
remeasurment and cost plus.  However, there are three types of remeasurment contract.  We
illustrate the five types with the example of a property developer seeking a contractor to
decorate offices in a new office block they are developing.
1. Cost-Plus:  The contractor is repaid all their expenses, plus an agreed profit margin.  The
agreed profit margin can be a percentage of the out-turn cost, (cost plus percentage fee), or
a fixed amount, (cost plus fixed fee).  Whatever the contractor spends on painters and
decorators, paint and wallpaper, is refunded, even if the unit rates are excessive and
productivity rates are low.
2. Remeasurement based on a Schedule of Rates:  The contractor is refunded their costs at
agreed unit rates.  The hours worked by painters and decorators, volume of paint and
number of rolls of wall paper are measured, and the contractor paid an agreed amount per
hour, litre and roll, even if the productivity levels are low.
3. Remeasurement based on a Bill of Quantities:  The client pays a standard rate per metre
squared of wall, based on agreed productivity rates and unit rates.   The contractor will
also want to claim for any delays caused by the client or other third parties.
4. Remeasurement based on a Bill of Materials:  The client pays a standard rate per room,
based on an average size of room, (or for a range of standard room sizes, one, two or three
windows wide).  This would be appropriate, as opposed to fixed price, if it was not known
in advance how many of the rooms were going to be one, two or three windows wide.
The contractor will again want to claim for delays.
5. Fixed Price:  The contractor is paid a fixed-price, lump-sum, for the entire job.  The client
needs to specify in advance the exact number of rooms that are going to be one, two or
three windows wide.  If they underestimate the ratio of one window to three window
offices, the contractor will benefit; if they overestimate, the contractor will claim.
There is not full agreement in the literature about these definitions, particularly what
constitutes a remeasurment contract.  The PMI® Guide to the PMBoK®5 defines only one type
of remeasurment contract, that based on a Schedule of Rates.  We think that most clients
letting a cost-plus contract would specify maximum unit rates.
Conceptually all five contract payment terms should deliver the same out-turn cost.  However,
we suspect opportunism by the contractor will lead them to inflate claims for quantities used
in the earlier types, and will lead them to create bogus claims for variations in the latter types.
So how can we put in place control mechanisms to stop the opportunity for deceit, and what is
the cost of those control mechanisms?  And how can we align the client’s and contractor’s
goals, so the contractor is rewarded for not indulging in opportunistic behaviour.
COST OF MANAGING THE CONTRACT
We consider first the transaction costs, that is the cost of planning, adapting and monitoring
task completion, the cost of managing the contractual relationship. Cox and Thompson6 say:
6… there is an administrative process involved in contracting over an above the required actions
of the contract.  This process has costs attached to it which are referred to as transaction costs.
Other transaction costs might include the identification, accreditation and selection of suppliers
and/or performance monitoring and feedback.
Are these transaction costs related to the level of risk of the project?  We assume the total cost
to the client of a project is the out-turn cost of the contract, plus the transaction cost of setting-
up and administering the contract.  The out-turn cost of setting-up and administering the
contract has four elements:
1. the cost of specifying the product in the tender documentation
2. the cost of specifying the work methods (process) in the tender documentation
3. the cost of managing variations to the specification of the product during project delivery
4. the cost of managing variations in the specification of the process during project delivery
We said above that in a totally rational world, the out-turn cost of the contract should be the
same under all five contract types.  Thus the total cost of the project to the client will be
determined by these four items, Figure 1, and so contract payment terms should be chosen
which minimize them.
On fixed price contracts, the cost of all four will be low if the uncertainty of the product is
low, that is the product is clearly understood, and the contractor takes responsibility for
determining the best method of delivering it.  This is especially so if the product can be
specified in terms of cardinal points7, as was the case with the Øresund Link, and the tunnels
and bridges on the Betuweroute Project.  However, as uncertainty of the product increases,
the cost of items 1, 3 and 4 will increase.  More effort is need to specifying the product in the
tender documentation, and the number and cost of processing variations will increase.  The
cost of processing variations will increase because the client will need to check the validity of
the size of the claims made, challenge some of the claims made, determine the impact of
changes on the cost and duration of other work.  Indeed it is the last of these, the cost of item
4 above, which will be present on a fixed price contract and not on a cost-plus contract.
On a cost-plus contract, there is little effort in specifying the product or process in advance,
(unless a target cost is desired).  However, a process will be needed to monitor the costs of
doing the work throughout the project.  The same process will be needed regardless of the
uncertainty of the product or process, and so the cost of administering the contract is
independent of the risk.  At low levels of uncertainty, this cost is higher than for a fixed price
contract, but at high levels of uncertainty it will be less, especially as cost item 4 bites for a
fixed price contract, (see Figure 1).  The cost of a remeasurement contract will lie in between.
Thus we see that if considering the cost of administering the contract, the choice of
governance structure is dependent on the uncertainty of the product, Figure 1 .  At low levels
of uncertainty, fixed price contracts give lower administration costs; at high levels, cost plus
contracts are best; and at intermediate levels, remeasurement ones are best.  The choice does
not depend on risk per se, and is independent of the uncertainty of the process.  Indeed, the
use of fixed price contracts for projects with uncertain process can encourage the contractor to
find the best work methods independent of the owner.  This can help achieve goal alignment
as the contractor increases their profit while finding the best solution for the owner.
7CRITIQUE OF THIS ANALYSIS
There is a sweeping assumption in this analysis, and it does not match experience.  The
sweeping assumption is that out-turn cost of a contract is independent of the contract type.
This we would not expect to be correct.  Different contract types incentivize the contractor in
different ways, and therefore we would expect their performance to be different under
different payment terms.  The transaction costs as identified are often fairly small compared
to the out-turn cost of the project, and the differences between them under different terms of
contract smaller still.  Thus we would expect the payment terms to be chosen not to minimize
the transaction costs, but to incentivize the contractors, as suggested by Levitt and March4.
This is borne out by evidence from the Betuweroute and Øresund Link Projects.  Fixed price
contracts are preferred when the uncertainty of the product is low, that is the project
deliverables are clearly defined, (supporting the above analysis), but when uncertainty of the
process is high.  Remeasurement contracts are preferred when the uncertainty of both the
product and process is low, which contradicts the above analysis, and conventional wisdom.
We should recall that we noted above that our three case studies, (Table 1), and other
sources1, are from the infrastructure, engineering construction and heavy engineering
industries, and so our results are limited to those industries.  Recently, we presented a
conference paper based on this work8.  One delegate said in the information systems industry
the transaction costs are much higher, and so in that industry would have as great an impact
on the selection of appropriate governance structures for a project as would incentivization.
The reason fixed price contracts are preferred on the Betuweroute Project when the
uncertainty of the process is high is that the contractor can then take responsibility for finding
the best way of delivering the project, and can make extra profits from finding innovative
solutions.  Conventional wisdom is that it is unfair to ask the contractor to bear the risk arising
from uncertainty of the process.  However, one of our respondents said:
The contract does not need to be fair, it just needs to be clear.
Indeed, the contractor can make additional profits from managing the risk, as long as they
understand it when they bid for the contract.  The contractor buys the risk off the client and
makes profits from managing it.  Our respondent said that this was the only way that some of
the work on the project could be done at prices the client could afford.  Under this scenario,
the four transaction costs identified above are all low.  There are few set-up costs, and little
need for the client to monitor the contractor’s expenditure.
So why are remeasurement contracts used on Betuweroute Project for construction of most of
the track foundation?  The reason is that where it is unnecessary to involve the contractor at
an early stage, the consultant has done the detail design before the contractors are appointed.
The contractors undertake the work according to a standard schedule of rates specified by the
Dutch Government.  Indeed, the contracts are almost fixed price, with the price set by the
client according to their schedule of rates, rather than being bid by the contractor, except if
there are variations they will be made according to that standard schedule.  Under this
scenario set up costs are high.  However, the detail design has to be done, whether it is done
by the consultant or the contractor, so the set up costs are fairly independent of the pricing
method adopted.  Using a standard schedule of rates will also make the monitoring costs low.
The client knows what the work should cost, and if it costs that there is no further discussion.
8A third type of contract type used on the Betuweroute Project is an alliance contract.  This has
been chosen for the construction of the foundation on one stretch of line where there is
considerable uncertainty of both the product and the process and it is also thought that the
client can make some contribution to resolving the problems.  Along this stretch, the new line
interferes with existing track, and there is a lot of cabling the location of which is not
precisely known.  There is also some resistance from local councils to give planning
permission which is causing delays.  Effectively a cost plus contract has been adopted, but
this has been wrapped in an alliance to achieve goal alignment between client and contractors
so they can work together to achieve an optimum outcome.  Under this scenario the set up
costs are low, but the monitoring costs are high.  However, the monitoring costs are contained
within the alliance, and are included in the normal project monitoring costs.
Thus, in all three cases, although the contract types are chosen to achieve goal alignment, they
also do minimize transactions costs.  Our respondent said that on the Beuweroute Project, the
contract types were chosen according to two parameters, Figure 2:
• complexity of the situation
• the ability of the client to contribute to the resolution of problems
However, we think that the selection also conforms to two other parameters:
• uncertainty of the product
• uncertainty of the process
If the product is uncertain, then the client must be involved in the resolution of the problems.
There are to further points to note:
1. Figure 2 is the Goals and Methods Matrix developed by Turner and Cochrane9
2. in Figure 2 we have not suggested a contract type for the fourth quadrant, certain
process/uncertain product.  Information systems projects fall in this quadrant9, but we
have already noted that they are beyond the scope of the study to date
GOAL ALIGNMENT AND AVOIDING OPPORTUNISM
Thus, the most significant issue to consider when choosing a governance structure for the
contract is the need to achieve goal alignment between the client and contractor, and to reduce
the chance and benefit for opportunism by the client or contractor.  According to Levitt and
March4, the purpose of project and contract organization is to create a cooperative system, and
that is achieved by achieving common objectives by properly incentivizing the contractors.
Turner10 shows that goal alignment comes from aligning the three Project Ps: process, product
and purpose.  The owner’s profit comes from operating the product to achieve the purpose,
the contractor’s comes from undertaking the process to deliver the product.  Lack of goal
alignment will result in maladaptation of one or more of the three project Ps:
maladaptation of the process:  the process does not deliver the product as designed
maladaptation of the product:  the product as designed does not meet the client’s needs
maladaptation of the purpose:  the client’s needs change from what was originally envisaged
9If the purpose, product and process are all defined, and unlikely to change, a remeasurement
contract is the best approach.  The client (or their consultant) do the detail design, and the
contractor is awarded the work for build only, at a price defined by an agreed schedule of
rates or bill of quantities, and which gives the contractor a reasonable profit.  However, it this
approach is unlikely to lead to improvement in the project’s design or cost.  The contractor is
not going to suggest improvements unless they share the benefits.  This just a lack of
cooperation by the contractor, but the first priority of the contractor’s directors is to their
shareholders.  They are absolutely required to maximize profits.  It would be a dereliction of
their duty to the shareholders to accept a remeasurement contract that did not allow them to
share in cost reductions and then to suggest cost reductions.  Clients need to recognize that.
Often public sector clients out of a misguided sense of having to obtain the best value for tax
payers, apply remeasurment contracts precisely, insisting any cost reductions are clawed back
from contractors.  This actually leads to the contracts being more expensive than they would
be if the contractor were allowed to share in the improvements, and has happened on the
Betuweroute project.  Creating one-sided contracts leads to a conflict system, and increasing
project costs.  The contract does not have to be fair, just clear; but if it is clearly unfair, and
the contractor is not left with the ability to manage risks to increase their profits, they will not
share a common objective with the client.  It must also be recognized that changes at this late
stage are likely to lead to higher costs, not justified by any accruing benefits11.
If the product and purpose are fairly predictable, particularly if the product can be defined by
cardinal points, then a fixed price contract can be the best way of ensuring the correct process
is adopted.  The contractor is made responsible for designing the best solution for delivering
the project’s product, and gains from any innovative solutions found.  The client must not
needlessly interfere in the contractor’s work.  One of our respondents said:
The client cannot be a control freak without taking a stick, and setting rules and
regulations, and that will undermine the contractor’s responsibility.  The client will
then be to blame for everything.
On the Øresund link, the client was there to help the contractors if they got into difficulty, but
left them alone if that was what they wanted.  On the other hand, on the Betuweroute Project
the client has interfered in some design and build contracts and that has led to friction.
If the project’s product is uncertain, or if the purpose may change through changing market
conditions, then a cost plus contract based on an alliance may be best, (see below).
Finally, the client needs to put in place an information system to identify opportunism by the
contractor at an early stage, without interfering or acting as a control freak.  With fixed price,
design and build contracts as used on the Øresund Link or Betuweroute Projects, that is not
necessary, but it is necessary on remeasurement or cost-plus contracts, adding to the cost of
their administration.  However, on fixed price contracts where there is potential maladaptation
of the product or purpose, it will be necessary to put in place a configuration management
process to manage the refinement of the product2.  That configuration management process
will increase the administration costs and the potential cost of variations, leading to the
undermining of the cost advantage of the fixed price contract as shown in Figure 1.
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ALLIANCE CONTRACTS
We saw in the previous section that alliance contracts can be useful where there is uncertainty
in the product and process and the client has some knowledge of the situation to help the
contractor directly to reduce the contract cost.  If the client has no knowledge, it is best to
leave the contractor to manage the problems on their own.  In Partnering in Europe1, the ECI
task force identify four criteria for adopting an alliance:
1. Owner business philosophy: The owner’s approach to business performance will influence
their desire to adopt partnering.  Three stages of development are recognized, business as
usual, continuous improvement or breakthrough performance.  Only owners looking for
breakthrough performance adopt partnering.  This implies that this philosophy must be
believed and operated at all levels in the owner organization.  Gaining buy-in from the
entire organization is key to making an alliance work, and is the first step in establishing a
partnering arrangement1, but is beyond the scope of this paper.  The Betuweroute Project
took a different perspective.  The owner was not so much looking to achieve levels of
performance never before achieved, as to achieve things considered highly complex.  It
was felt the market had to solve the problems for the client.  Where the client had no
competence, fixed price design and build contracts were chosen, and the contractors left to
solve the problems, as they were considered the best and most motivated.  However, in the
one case where the client had some competence, an alliance contract was adopted.
2. Project Size: The project has to be above a certain size to make the overhead of
establishing the alliance, and transaction costs of maintaining it worthwhile.  Projects
below about $US 150 million are not considered worthwhile.
3. Project risk and uncertainty: The project must involve risk in order for it to be worthwhile
for the client and contractors to be able to share it.  Alliances are powerful risk mitigating
organizations, but the also create a cooperation system, by motivating both parties to
reduce risk to share in the profits.  Scott shows how the combination of business culture
and risk leads to three different approaches to contracting, Figure 3.
4. Alliance partner availability and capability: The alliance partners must have the
competence and financial backing to share the risk.  To this the Betuweroute Project
Client add the competence of the client.  They must have the competence to contribute to
the problem solving, otherwise they just get in the way and inhibit the contractor.
CONCLUSIONS
We started  by trying to use transaction cost analysis to show when different contract pricing
terms would be adopted.  We demonstrated that this approach shows it is not risk per se
which determines the appropriate type of contract, but uncertainty of the eventual product.
However, if we view the purpose of a contract is to create a project organization, and that
should be based on a system of cooperation not conflict, then the need for goal alignment is
more significant.  This requires that all parties to a contract should be properly incentivized,
and that is achieved by adopting contract pricing terms as suggested in Figure 2.
Appropriate channels of communication need to be maintained, and these are one of the main
transaction costs in project contract management, and do seem to be minimized by adopting
the appropriate pricing mechanism as suggested by Figure 2.  Thus goal alignment is the main
criterion of selecting contract pricing terms, but transaction costs are minimized en passant.
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TABLES
Table 1: Interviews conducted and projects analyzed
FIGURES
Figure 1: Relative cost of managing fixed price and cost-plus contracts at different levels of
uncertainty of the product
Figure 2: Selection of contract types
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Project Number/Type
of Contracts
Person Interviewd
Nerefco Refinery 1 Alliance Design and construction
contractor’s project manager
Øresund Link – fixed link
Sweden-Denmark
3 Fixed price design &
build
Owner’s contract manager on
contract for immersed tunnel
Amsterdam North-South
Metro Link
12 Remeasurement
Betuweroute Civil Works –
high speed freight rail
Rotterdam-Germany
7 Remeasurement
4 D&B FP
1 Alliance
Manager of Waardse Alliantie,
managing the alliance contract for
23km of trach foundation
Table 1: Interviews conducted and projects analyzed
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Figure 1: Relative cost of managing fixed price and cost-plus contracts at different levels of
uncertainty of the product
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Uncertainty of the product
Lo Hi
Hi
Fixed Price
Design and Build
Cost Plus
Design and Build
Alliance
Hi
Uncertainty
of the process
Lo
Remeasurement
Build Only
This situation
was not
researched
Lo
Complexity
Lo Hi
Ability of client to contribute
Figure 2: Selection of contract types
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Trust
and
Mutual
respect
Relational Contracts
High definition
Target sum bidding
Focus on efficiency
Alliances
Goal allignment
Early involvement
Focus on Effectiveness
Business
Culture
Transaction
Based
and
Traditional
Conventional
High Definition
Lump sum
Claim mentality
Get out
Simple Complex
Business challenge
Figure 3: Three contracting approaches
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